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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
KILMON V. STATE: A PREGNANT WOMAN'S INTENTIONAL 
INGESTION OF COCAINE CANNOT FORM THE BASIS FOR 
A CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 3-204(A)(1) OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW ARTICLE FOR THE RECKLESS 
ENDANGERMENT OF HER LATER-BORN CHILD. 
By: Jason Weintraub 
In a consolidated case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
a pregnant woman's prenatal ingestion of cocaine does not form the 
basis for a conviction under section 3-204(a)(l) of the Criminal Law 
Article for the reckless endangerment of her later-born child. Kilman 
v. State, 394 Md. 168, 905 A.2d 306 (2006). The Court concluded 
Maryland's reckless endangerment statute, as outlined in Maryland 
Criminal Law Article section 3-204(a)(l) (2006), was not designed 
with the legislative intent to hold pregnant women criminally liable for 
the prenatal ingestion of cocaine. Kilman, 394 Md. at 183, 905 A.2d 
at 315. 
The first of the two consolidated cases began in June, 2004, when 
Regina Kilmon ("Kilmon") gave birth to her son at Easton Memorial 
Hospital. At the time of birth, a drug screening of the child revealed 
675 nanograms per milliliter of cocaine in his system; 375 nanograms 
per milliliter above minimum sensitivity levels. In August, 2004, 
Kilmon was charged in the Circuit Court for Talbot County with 
second-degree child abuse, contributing to child delinquency, reckless 
endangerment, and possession of a controlled dangerous substance. 
All charges were based on evidence that Kilmon ingested cocaine 
while pregnant. Kilmon pled guilty to reckless endangerment and was 
sentenced to four years in prison. The Court of Special Appeals 
granted her application for leave to appeal. However, the Court of 
Appeals granted certiorari before proceedings commenced. 
In the second case, Kelly Lynn Cruz ("Cruz") was admitted to 
Easton Memorial Hospital in January, 2005, complaining of stomach 
pains. Hospital records indicated she was twenty-nine weeks 
pregnant. Cruz gave birth to a three-pound, two-ounce baby boy. 
Drug screenings given to both the newborn and the mother at the 
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hospital tested positive for cocaine. In April, 2005, Cruz was charged 
in the Circuit Court for Talbot County with second-degree child abuse, 
contributing to child delinquency, reckless endangerment, and 
possession of a controlled dangerous substance. 
In Cruz's case, the Circuit Court for Talbot County found her guilty 
of reckless endangerment and imposed a sentence of five years in 
prison, with two-and-a-half years suspended in favor of supervised 
probation and drug treatment. Cruz appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari prior to any proceedings by the intermediate appellate court. 
The Court consolidated the Kilmon and Cruz appeals to consider the 
common issue of whether the intentional ingestion of cocaine, while 
pregnant, violates Md. Criminal Law Code Ann. section 3-204(a)(1). 
Kilman, 394 Md. at 121,905 A.2d at 308. 
Section 3-204(a)(1) makes it a misdemeanor for an individual to 
"engage in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious 
physical injury to another." Kilman, 394 Md. at 173, 905 A.2d at 308. 
The State argued that the appellants' prenatal ingestion of cocaine 
recklessly endangered their children immediately upon and after their 
births, and such conduct specifically falls under the purview of section 
3-204(a)(1). Kilman, 394 Md. at 173, 905 A.2d at 309. However, the 
State avoided the controversial debate regarding the classification of 
an embryo or fetus as a person by noting in its briefs that the "person" 
harmed by the appellant's conduct was the child, after the child's live 
birth. [d. 
In support of its argument that a pregnant woman's reckless 
conduct which harms her unborn child should be punishable under 
section 3-204(a)(1), the State noted that a third-party is criminally 
liable for an injury committed while a child is in utero, but later born 
alive. Kilman, 394 Md. at 175, 905 A.2d at 310 (citing Williams v. 
State, 77 Md. App. 411, 550 A.2d 722 (1988), aff'd, 316 Md. 617, 561 
A.2d 216 (1989)). In Williams, the defendant shot a woman who was 
nine months pregnant with a bow and arrow. [d. The mother died as a 
result of the injury; her child was born alive, but died shortly 
thereafter. [d. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the defendant 
could be convicted of two counts of manslaughter, one for the mother 
and one for the child born alive. [d. The State notes that the "born 
alive" rule, and its application to the crime of common law 
manslaughter, was upheld by the Court of Appeals in Williams just 
prior to the enactment of the reckless endangerment statute in 1989. 
Kilman, 394 Md. at 176, 905 A.2d at 311. As a result, the State argues 
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that the General Assembly, in enacting section 3-204(a)(l), meant to 
"criminalize conduct committed by anyone, including a pregnant 
woman, that recklessly endangers the later-born child." [d. 
According to the Court, whether the General Assembly intended to 
include the conduct of a pregnant woman who might endanger her 
child is unclear, as the reckless endangerment statute does not 
specifically address such behavior. Kilman, 394 Md. at 177, 905 A.2d 
at 311. As a result, other factors must be considered in absence of 
clear legislative intent. [d. Based on the State's arguments, the 
application of the statute to the conduct of pregnant women "could 
well be construed to include not just the ingestion of unlawful 
controlled substances but a whole host of intentional and conceivably 
reckless activity that could not possibly have been within the 
contemplation of the Legislature." Kilman, 394 Md. at 177, 905 A.2d 
at 311. According to the Court, if the State's position were to prevail, 
a pregnant woman's criminal liability for actions ranging from failing 
to maintain a proper diet, to avoiding proper prenatal medical care, 
would depend entirely on the aggressiveness of a particular prosecutor. 
Kilman, 394 Md. at 178, 905 A.2d at 312. 
To further its argument that the Maryland General Assembly did 
not intend to consider the ingestion of cocaine by pregnant women a 
criminal act under section 3-204(a)(l), the Court also looked to the 
history of failed legislation. Kilman, 394 Md. at 178, 905 A.2d at 312. 
In 1990, four legislative proposals attempted to classify physical 
injuries to an unborn child that resulted from a mother's use of 
controlled dangerous substances as criminal child abuse. Kilman, 394 
Md. at 179, 905 A.2d at 312. Subsequently, all of those bills failed. 
[d. In the 2004 legislative session, the Unborn Victims of Violence 
Act was introduced to criminalize actions that "recklessly create a 
substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to an unborn child." 
Kilman, 394 Md. at 180, 905 A.2d at 313. Similar to previous 
attempts at criminalizing pregnant women's drug use, the legislation 
failed. [d. 
Over the course of sixteen years of legislative history, the Court 
noted that the General Assembly has failed to impose criminal 
penalties for a pregnant woman's ingestion of controlled substances, 
due to the effects such ingestion might have on the child, either before 
or after birth. Kilman, 394 Md. at 181, 905 A.2d at 314. The Court 
deferred to the way in which the General Assembly dealt with the 
issue of prenatal ingestion of illegal drugs, specifically its desire to 
provide drug treatment programs for pregnant women, and the 
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termination of parental rights as a mechanism if these women failed to 
properly care for their child. [d. at 182, 905 A.2d at 314. The Court 
noted that incarcerating drug-addicted pregnant women had proven 
"ineffective in other States in deterring either that conduct or addiction 
generally on the part of pregnant women." Kilman, 394 Md. at 182, 
905 A.2d at 314. As such, in light of the way in which the Maryland 
General Assembly had addressed this issue, the Court held it was not 
the legislative intent that section 3-204(a)(l) of the Criminal Law 
Article apply to the prenatal drug ingestion of pregnant women. 
Kilman, 394 Md. at 183,905 A.2d at 315. 
The Court in Kilman upheld the longstanding view in Maryland 
that drug-addicted mothers need access to treatment, not punishment. 
While a pregnant mother's ingestion of drugs may in fact be reckless 
in nature, the Court's decision to provide treatment, instead of 
incarceration, may give mothers and their children a greater chance at 
overcoming such terrible addictions. 
